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Abstract

Human-machine interaction issues must be
addressed in designs and implementation of
automation for cybersecurity. The community must
not start from scratch to implement best practices;
we review for the community and practitioners the
relevant history and research done by human factors
for human-automation interaction. We bring these
theories and results to a handful of cybersecurity
elements with two main goals: (1) educate the cyber
discipline, and (2) provide guidelines toward
building automated cybersecurity technology.

1. Introduction
The human role in cybersecurity operations is a
major one. A lack of operators capable and qualified
for the many job roles and demands of cybersecurity
is a key problem to solve. Operators here can be
viewed as the general cybersecurity workforce, which
the NIST framework defines as “a workforce with
work roles that have an impact on an organization’s
ability to protect its data, systems, and operations.”
For example, per [1] a Cyber Defense Analyst “uses
data collected from a variety of cyber defense tools
(e.g., IDS alerts, firewalls) to analyze events that
occur within their environments for the purposes of
mitigating threats.” This role has been a major target
for automation due to well-known problems of
burnout and fatigue [2]. These are not the same as
end-users, which have received plenty of research
study [3], [4].
A solution to lack of staffing in many domains
has been to implement automation into the work
process with varying degrees of success. As
cybersecurity aims to increase the efficacy of
operations but struggles to meet its staffing targets,
automation and autonomy represent two solutions
being explored. As a science, human factors
engineering has been influential in understanding
what makes automation implementations successful
or unsuccessful. These design principles have been
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/70854
978-0-9981331-4-0
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

Dirk Van Bruggen
Laboratory for Advanced Cybersecurity Research

demonstrated in other domains of high complexity,
including aviation and process control environments –
but not yet applied to cyber.
We define two key terms here to clarify our
discussion in this paper, automation, and autonomy.
Automation: technology that actively selects data,
transforms information, makes decisions, or controls
processes (normally where humans used to do these
tasks; [5]). Autonomy: automation that also ‘thinks’ and
updates, trains itself, and is wholly responsible and
authoritative for its actions completely absent a human.
While automation is present across society especially in
modern operations and technology environments,
autonomy by this definition is not. We focus on
automation as a more relevant near-term possibility.
Autonomy is a goal identified in many strategic
documents describing the future of operations. But it is
also a long-term, and possibly overly optimistic
futuristic goal. In contrast, automation in cybersecurity
could improve operations in the near term. It may enable
rapid reaction to detect and disrupt cyber-attacks before
they do damage. However, the potential is mediated by
the need to carefully consider human cognition and task
performance in: (1) how the work may be affected by
technology implementation, (2) how interactions with
automation should be designed (3) deciding what tasks
should be automated.
We saw an opportunity to educate current
cybersecurity professionals, including those working on
software, IT, and managing those activities (along with
researchers), to help them avoid prior ‘ironies’ of
automating activities. Secondly, the reviewed content
leads to several best practices pulled from the field and
discussed in the frame of cybersecurity which could be
used by program developers, system architects and
human systems integration experts to better design and
develop new automation. These have not been
traditionally applied to cybersecurity programs. Making
this connection, in a rich and informative way, is the key
contribution of this work, in addition to providing design
recommendations that could improve the safety, security
and performance of cyber systems.
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2. Human automation interactions
A common but fatal design flaw is the lack of
attention paid by designers to the interaction of the
system with the human who operates it. These
elements are routinely ignored or left unstudied,
because they are (incorrectly) viewed as unscientific,
unhelpful, overly complex, out of scope, or simply
difficult to understand. As with much of human
behavior, members of the general population feel,
having lived a human life, that they can understand
the cognition of users, and make accurate predictions
about how their system will be used [6]. Such a bias
is made worse when these same people, taking the
role of system creator, are intimately familiar with
the actual design and operation of the system [7].
Biases are one topic area in cybersecurity, but
investigations of them so far have not focused on
automation [8], [9]. Particular attention has been
given to events in which human interaction with
automated systems resulted in catastrophe; in other
words, a worthy system still had a negative outcome,
and that outcome was linked to poor humanautomation interactions. The USS Vincennes incident
in which a civilian airliner was shot down; Patriot
missile battery friendly fire incidents in which allied
aircraft were shot down [10]; recent US Navy ship
collisions [11], [12], and countless unfortunate
accidents in aviation and process control resulting in
crashes and loss of life reveal an unfortunate
message: in realistic human-automation interaction
conditions, there has not been enough attention paid
to how humans use, misuse or abuse these types of
systems [13], [14].
While the examples from aviation and military
events are not in the cyber realm, they have clear
implications. Cybersecurity operations are also
occurring in complex systems and organizations that
often have numerous protections built in to avoid
catastrophe. As in both military and aviation
domains, cybersecurity has the potential for severe
consequences. And finally, both domains rely on
proper interaction with humans even with high levels
of automation. The good news is that prior research
has worked to improve these interactions and derived
guiding principles for development. Human factors,
psychology, cognitive engineering, human systems
engineering, human systems integration, and its many
other similar names brings with it this specialized
understanding of the human-automation interaction
problem. Yet these fields and their guidance have

remained isolated from cybersecurity operations until
very recently [15], despite work done in HCI on end user
and developer security practices which is not applicable
for the cybersecurity workforce [16], [17].

2.1 Theoretical maturation and justification
At its epistemological roots, automation has been
defined as technology (computers, in the modern era)
taking over what was once performed by a human [5],
[18]. At fault for some of the incidents mentioned
previously was an ideological perspective of separately
identifying different agents’ capabilities – the “man is
better at, machine is better at” categories (see [19]). The
abilities of people are different than machines; yet this is
no substitute for a design philosophy. The belief that
knowing who is best at a task should dictate who does it
dates back to the misinterpretation of a 1951 technical
report by Paul Fitts and colleagues ([20], p. 7-8). In this
report, the authors attempted to represent differences
between human and machine; but their goal was not to
assign different work functions or roles (e.g., memory,
repetition) to either human OR machine. As the ability
of machines and computers began to grow, these
conceptualizations were challenged, and changed in part
because engineers had to confront actual users within
increasingly complex systems. Nearly thirty years after
the Fitts report (1951), the seminal report of Sheridan
and Verplank in 1978 [21] further suggested many
different, and potentially useful methods of shared
control and augmentations between human and computer
including extending, relieving, backing-up or replacing.
Human and machine were no longer separate entities
each doing some work in a siloed fashion. The report
also developed the now widely known levels of
automation, which are famously cited and remain central
to discussions of human-machine interactions today. But
ironically, they too, were only produced as a suggestion
by the authors, an indication and provocation of the
much larger variety of possible configurations; they were
not to be treated as an algorithm, taxonomy, or limited
set of options, or even as design guidelines [22].
Sheridan and Verplank helped lead engineers away from
siloed agents in a system, but this was perhaps less
intuitive in practice. And, because engineers gravitated
to the levels-of-automation definition, new designs still
resulted in problems. Many more modern methods and
theory surrounding development of automation are now
available; other ‘levels’ of automation scales are present
in the literature [23].
A few modern updates [24], [25] move from levels
to degrees of automation and tie the levels of automation
to human performance across various functions (e.g.,
informing, executing, selecting). An abstracted, 4-stage
information processing view of cognition was used [24],
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and the authors represent a given automated system
as having different levels of automation, rather than
one [21] and map this to human information
processing (information acquisition, analysis,
decision selection, and action implementation).
Readers may recognize the information processing
schema as similar to the “OODA” loop ([26]), and
each has alignment with observation, orientation,
decision making and action. The description allows a
designer to recognize specific impacts on different
‘stages’ of human cognitive processes based on
incorporating their designs (see Figure 1). Automated
systems can also operate at high or low levels (i.e,
doing more or less of the task) for each information
processing stage. The framework can make a big
impact both in design and interpretation of larger
complex system operations. A recent meta-analysis
showed for example, that automation failures for
systems that partially or fully automate human
decision-making
and
action-taking functions
according to the Parasuraman et al. concept are
particularly disruptive to human and overall system
performance [27]; whereas some relatively high error
rates from automated systems can be tolerable, and
even useful, for information gathering, and analysis
[28]. Thus, the information processing stages – as a
characterization of what an automated system is
doing for the human – helps to design an automated
component; it helps the psychologists and human
factors engineer understand how the automation
effects that human process. The framework continues
to be a landmark as a result, especially for its specific
section on design methodology (discussed later).

3. “Ironies of Automation”
The instantiation of automation is not, itself,
problematic. The conditions for ironies emerge
around any tasks where a high degree of complexity,
as well as unpredictability, combines with automation
and co-location of that automation with a human
operator. Bainbridge [29] discussed how automation
created in industry often failed to meet its goals and
instead made things worse. Though these were
observed in industrial processes, they are more
widespread, also occurring in domains such as
transportation. Yet, they are not emphasized or
widely known for cybersecurity. A few of the ironies
revealed appear to be common sense; yet, in every
case they are ideologically at odds with the old
engineering philosophies of “automate everything the
human cannot do well” or “automate everything that
you can automate” which persist today in many
realms. Former head of the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) Barry Strauch also noted that

despite 35 years of awareness and study in aviation,
major accidents involving automation continued to occur
[14], a result no doubt because lessons had to be learned
and it takes a very long time to apply them in that field.
While human-automation interaction is broadly defined,
where can the lessons of the past apply to applications of
automation in cybersecurity? We call attention to the
most prominent ironies of automation from the longer
list by Bainbridge [29], and take the extra step to link
them to cybersecurity.

3.1 Irony 1: Changing the nature of work by
deskilling, altering cognitive demand, and hiding
operator deficits
Adding automation fundamentally changes the task
for the operators and the skills they need to succeed [30],
[31]. It can lead to a “requirements shift” in individuals
and staffing, training requirements, and can create
(rather than remove) some taskwork that is poorly suited
to humans, such as vigilant monitoring. In the
cybersecurity space, many roles are already
understaffed, and the definition of expertise itself
unclear as is the process by which new experts are
created. The narrower the realm of operations, the
narrower the expertise required becomes. Introducing
automation into a narrow operational context may
reduce the skilled workforce that are in such high
demand, or may at least reduce the ability of those
experts to operate effectively after longer periods of
automated performance. Little attention has been paid to
this phenomena for cybersecurity, but pilots and aviation
companies understand and recommend refreshing and
retaining manual flight control skills. Automation can
hide skill deficits [13]. Indeed some skill deficiencies
emerge only under non-typical conditions, when the
automation components cannot or do not perform, and
instead the humans or other components of the system
are under increased demand or authority. Unfortunately,
automation can even create emergent conditions where
the human must respond perfectly to avert disaster [29];
therein lies the irony: one begins automating to remove
the role of the human and achieves it only to find that
performance suffers potentially catastrophic collapse.
And on top of it all, due to the change in skill
required, it is not that automation always reduces the
staffing requirements. In some cases, it increases them –
or increases the need for more experienced, harder to
find talent. Often, these effects go beyond individuals
and narrow sets of operation. For cybersecurity, it is
important to consider the broader, system wide effects.
One clear example of the ironies of automation was in
the implementation of the “optimal manning” program,
which involved a massive amount of technology
promising to reduce workforce required by the Navy
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through computers and automation. This program has
since been rescinded and can be viewed to have
caused exactly the above ironic consequences [32].
A growing area of investment in security
organizations is that of security orchestration,
automation and response (SOAR) solutions. Per
Gartner, SOAR platforms enable organizations to
collect monitoring data (e.g. alerts, logs, telemetry) in
a central location where incident analysis and triage
can be performed leveraging a combination of human
and machine power to then drive standardized
incident response activities [33]. Organizations hope
that these systems will ease burdens on operators by
centralizing all interactions into a single interface.
However, these platforms introduce new skill
requirements for the security organizations both to
develop and integrate SOAR technologies into the
existing infrastructure as well as to troubleshoot
problems in these complex systems when they arise.
It is important that as such systems are rolled
out, operators continue to train up in all of the
underlying tools and technologies to ensure the
maintenance of skills. Even more important is for
new employees brought into the organization to
undergo not only training on the underlying tools but
also practice manual procedures to build up the
muscle memory to ensure correct application of skills
while under the pressure of non-standard situations.
Organizations may understand some of these issues.
When interviewed, only 8% of respondents believed
that they would experience a reduction in staffing
levels due to automation. However, almost 50%
expected that they would better utilize their current
staff members [34]. In order to ensure automation
systems live up to these expectations, organizations
will need to act strategically to ensure tasks and
operator skills are both developed with these risks in
mind.

3.2 Irony 2: Reduction and loss of situational
awareness, and the challenges of monitoring
automation.
A system doing the work for a user, often still
requires that operator to engage in monitoring of that
work [35], [36]. No system can be built that is
flawless; we often check the simplest of technologies,
even our thermostats, despite their reliability. When
designed, such a system is usually not viewed as
work intensive, despite monitoring and vigilance
behavior being highly mentally demanding [37]. It is
assumed that with the automation doing the work, the
human has additional time and mental resources they
can allocate to other tasks. And therein lies the irony;
a justification for bringing in automation is to relieve

operators to do “more important” work. Yet often they
are then required to monitor the system; to do this,
operators now have to devote additional mental effort to
tracking the automated work and if the system is highly
effective or very quick in its actions, there will not – as a
matter of design – be enough time for humans to verify
[29].
Reduction and loss of situational awareness is a
serious associated concern, and affects both training and
practice as well as operational elements [38]–[40]. The
use of automation can result in reduced awareness of the
ongoing work [23], [41]. Simply put, automation can
hide states of the system, along with critical information,
which allows users to understand and make predictions
about current and near-future states of the system [42],
[43], and other processes rendering the operator less
aware.
An example in the cybersecurity field can be seen
with intrusion detection systems (IDS) and alert fatigue
[2]. IDS were developed to automate the collection of
data and detection of threats based on various types of
network and endpoint data. However, due to the high
volume of false positive alerts generated by IDS, tier 1
analysts spend most of their time monitoring these alerts,
often without finding any true positives. A significant
goal motivating adding automation is to reduce alert
fatigue among analysts and allow them to devote more
of their time to deeper investigations. Unfortunately,
when organizations who have used automation are
surveyed, only 36% are confident that automation would
reduce alert fatigue [34].
In addition to difficulties in implementing IDS
programs, it is well known that the verification and
validation of these systems is a complex and potentially
expensive process that often goes overlooked [44].
Therefore it could be argued that while the initial
automation increased the situational awareness for
analysts by continually checking for known threats, it
also creates a false sense of security and a follow-on lack
of awareness as to whether or not the system is, indeed,
performing as intended.
While developing and maintaining situational
awareness is a challenge across a multitude of domains,
a remaining challenge in cybersecurity research has been
to understand and quantify defender cognitive situational
awareness (e.g., [45]–[47]). The effect on awareness of
automated components or systems being introduced is
rarely examined in the context of cybersecurity. But we
can assume in general that poorly designed systems will
reduce, not improve, cyber defenders’ awareness unless
shown otherwise. Further support for this can be found
in the generally user-agnostic design and evaluation of
other cybersecurity tools and displays, as shown in a
review by Staheli and colleagues [48].
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These ironies are the result of complex
interactions between the humans and the system,
where optimizing one aspect of operation can have
unforeseen consequences; yet the persistence of the
ironies suggests that at least some of the humanautomation interactions can be improved ahead of
time by addressing them. These ironies can in effect
be framed as “principles”: they are tried and tested
across multiple disciplines; they align with existing
theory; they appear to occur for experienced and
novice operators; they rely on behavioral evidence
when people have skin in the game. Linking these
principles to cyber automation and dissolving the
automation-centric mindset in designers is beneficial.

3.3 A concrete cybersecurity example of
human automation interactions
As discussed in Section 2.1, automation tasks
can be described by using both levels and degrees of
automation. Figure 1 shows a task may fall across the
spectrum.

Figure 1: Comparison of levels and degrees
of cybersecurity automation
An automated information acquisition program
for cybersecurity may pull in vast quantities of data,
which normally a person or team of people would
have done by searching multiple sources to find and
integrate. This system could be characterized as
having a high level of automation, but a low degree
of automation (it highly automates an earlier portion
of the human information process). Once information
is input, a highly automated analysis may begin
which searches the data for certain properties (e.g., if
the data were packet capture or connection logs,
perhaps we are looking for anomalous behavior
originating from an IP we do not usually see
interactions with) – again, a high level of automation.
However, for this analysis, now the degree of
automation is increased because we move deeper into
information processing.
Once an alert is triggered the human-machine
system must reason on what to do (sometimes this is

known ahead of time, but often, uncertainty and
emergent conditions require some reflection on rules of
engagement, strategy, etc.). Fully performed by the
human, this requires no automation and is therefore low
level and no degree. Finally, action is implemented (the
action doesn’t have to be extreme, like blocking the IP
and quarantining the machines it touched - it could
simply be to delay a decision until certain data emerges,
or to go search for more information), creating an
iterative cycle.
Action is partially automated at a low level (e.g.,
stages of actions linked together by various computer
systems) but operating at a high degree of automation
(action implementation). Higher degrees and higher
levels may need more scrutiny than lower ones, as
described before.

4. Cybersecurity applications and practice
The inability to make systems which have
guaranteed behaviors results in systems which can
inexplicably fail in unfortunate ways, particularly when
under adversarial attack. Systems used to perform
automated actions for cyber operations are often
complex, making deep understanding very difficult even
for experts. As a result, cyber systems tend to be
completely trusted - until they are not. If the individual
deficiency leading to the software or hardware failure
can be mitigated, then we may recover our trust quickly;
but multiple, correlated, or continuous failure, may lead
to it being abandoned altogether.
While automation is present in almost all actions
taken in a cyber environment, few to none of these
operates without human intervention and guidance.
Currently, even “manual” operations are mostly
automated, but a human serves at the helm in
supervisory role of a software application, which
performs one or more actions in sequence. These
automated aspects hide vast and complex sequences of
automated steps by the software, operating system, and
hardware on which it executes.
These feats of automation help defensive and
offensive cyber operators to avoid manual overload.
Operators not only make heavy use of pre-existing
software automation mechanisms, but often develop a
litany of custom scripts, tailored algorithms, and
mission-specific procedures – each of which serves to
improve their effectiveness many times over. Neither
compensates well for tactical and strategic input by the
operator (whether at setup, or ad-hoc during a mission),
though they qualify as “automation”.
For example, when an attacker considers how to
scan a network, s/he has a range of options, from highly
automated (but sometimes potentially “loud”, detectable)
scans, to very manual, low and slow “quiet” scans. The
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human is the arbiter calibrating the level of desired
support of the machine, or the “level of automation”.
The information acquisition component could be
highly automated by these scans – they may reveal
most of the information. However, most by
themselves may not do the ‘analysis’ portion (which
is left to other programs, or operator assessment).
Further, the operator is generally making the decision
about the course of action. Actions themselves are
usually taken by the operator. Of course, some types
of defensive capabilities automate this entire process.
And automation of data collection and interpretation
to support reconnaissance for example, could be
further explored and understood given humanautomation interaction theory and background.
Across cyber defense, some automation systems
require the human to ‘turn on’ the automation
capability and remain vigilant of alerts. For example,
a SOAR platform allows for many different
playbooks to be developed, and then can trigger them
based on automated rule checking (e.g. all e-mails
with attachments should be have the attachment fed
into a malware sandbox before delivering the e-mail)
or human driven commands. These are sort of expert
systems approaches that may automate certain pieces
or raise alerts up to humans to act. Allowing the
human to make the choice of enabling automation
can outperform other configurations (e.g., [49]).
However, in cybersecurity applications we should be
wary of conditions which may make the arrangement
unstable. Firstly, surprises can disrupt operators and
they may be unable (or simply forget) to turn on the
automation as a result. While this makes little sense
using the IDS system as an example, it may apply in
more futuristic network posture situations, where
automation is more prevalent. Imagine a case in
which a unit or network senses attack and thus
automatically engages a set of network-wide actions
to protect critical assets from being disrupted further.
Under normal conditions, these rules would be
constricting other missions and goals of the
organization, but under attack conditions they may
save or preserve access to key resources. Knowing
when to engage the rules may be handed to an
automated controller, invoking the automation issues
previously discussed. Second, people may choose not
to rely on the machine, even when their own
performance is suffering. Examples of ignoring or
overriding systems at critical moments (as in the
grounding of the Costa Concordia), suggest operators
can easily become “overconfident” in their abilities,
or underconfident in the system’s abilities [50].
Software environments are particularly prone to
automation being blamed for poor performance
overall, even when performance without the

automation – especially when such a system is under
attack – is much worse. Leadership or management may
also be vulnerable, since they are more removed from
the potential feedback loops calibrating other front-line
operators’ behaviors and trust. In a recent survey of
security operation center (SOC) professionals, 82% were
confident in their ability to detect threats within their
environment while less than 36% of professionals are
actually tracking common performance metrics that
could back up the confidence, such as mean time to
detect (MTTD) or mean time to respond (MTTR) [51].
Careful consideration of where to place authority
over automated actions is due, especially within an
organization, as the authority may not understand what
they are really doing. Mechanisms of ensuring trust (and
blame) need to be sufficiently understood and traced to
shore up feedback loops between performing agents
(both automated and human), and better enable
organizational learning.
The use of an adaptive automation system may offer
some advantages to performance and awareness [52].
Adaptive automation systems may adjust configurations,
performance parameters, or even aspects of the external
environment based on user attention and cognitive load,
potentially mitigating loss of awareness, offering
reduced cognitive workload, and outperforming
configurations lacking adaptive or shared control. They
do not rely on the user to activate the system – they can
turn themselves on, which solves some of the problems
of adaptable automation. However they invoke other
problems to be solved, such as determining when the
automation triggers (by what mechanism), which has
been the target of many research efforts [53], [54].
Leaving the implementation of automation – what
does it do, when does it do it - up to the operator may be
a bad idea. Yet taking it out of their hands is also
problematic. A whole domain of study surrounding
function allocation and authority can be consulted, but is
hardly conclusive of how to arrange who does what,
only on how to measure potential configuration [55].
There are ways of designing for the situation; but they
are not simple processes (see Figure 1).

5. Human factors in designing for
automation in cybersecurity
Recommendations for developing automation and
autonomy in cybersecurity are still outstanding, and
there are many reasons for this gap. First, while human
investigations in cybersecurity appear prolific, as shown
previously they are primarily concerned with end-user
activity – whereas most predictions and capabilities
being developed to automate security are at the
professional operator level. Second, it is likely that
specific recommendations would be inadequate in
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creating new systems. A common complaint against
the study of the human systems integration and
human factors realms is that the advice is often not
broad enough; noting that these methods do not
generate the specific guidelines needed to develop AI
technology, and that they rely on the specifics for
each unique system. This makes scaling very difficult
for organizations like the military who want to
integrate AI across mission areas, operators, devices,
and authority structures. We have addressed that
problem here by explicitly keeping the advice broad
to allow for a variety of different cyber-related
products to benefit from our best, global principles.
This is a strength, not a weakness. Finally, the gap
certainly indicates that more work is required, and
this work should be a community effort – not only
done by those with skill in IT and security, but also
(and not separately) those with psychological
expertise, usability, engineering and system
integration as their expertise.
Parasuraman et al. (2000) developed a way to
incorporate human information processing approach
into some general guidelines for creating, identifying
and evaluating different levels and degree of
automation (Figure 1 below).These guidelines should
be implemented after a task or job is understood from
both the human, and more technical or computational
perspectives. One would like some sense of function
allocation – the ‘who does what’ – to be understood,
explored, and defined throughout this process (Figure
2), and then evaluated by metrics [55].

and roles of the operator(s). Following that, one can
propose various automation levels and degrees, to
include whether the system should be adaptive,
adaptable, or some other mixed-initiative system in order
to improve the overall task process. The key there is to
have an experienced human factors team to evaluate the
consequences of different configuration with measures
such as situational awareness, trust, attention allocation,
and mental workload all of which are influenced by
automation.
Finally, other aspects can be incorporated such as
understanding the influence of different reliability levels
and the cost of different types of mistakes (humans and
automation both create these). One critical aspect of the
evaluation should be failure detection. An initial attempt
at defining areas or processes for candidate automation
could come from widely published, and high-level, ‘kill
chains’ [58] in offense, and in defense.
Additional detail for particular steps in an intrusion
kill chain may be drawn from the ample literature on
‘attack graphs’ which detail individual steps taken for
steps in the kill chain. This sets some boundaries for
design and for operator assessment. Generating ties to
operator information processing (e.g., is the operator
taking information in – recon, or making decisions about
what to do next) should further shape design of
automated cyber operations.
Defensive tactics could be viewed and categorized
according to information processing levels used by
various blue team members. Then, one can use the
Parasuraman et al. (2000) framework to consider
different, desirable degrees of automation as related to
each defense tactic. While difficult in the abstract, when
given the specific network context of “Detection” or
“Degradation” as a Blue Team mission, it may be
tractable.

6. Recommendations

Figure 2. Derived from Parasuraman et al.
(2000) showing process and guidelines on
developing automation technology.
In other words, a system designer should start by
focusing on the existing human workflow and
information requirements – perhaps broken down
into the different information processing types, goals,

Below are several recommendations, the first
primarily concerned with the design and design process
surrounding developing automation for cybersecurity.
As discussed previously, these are general guidelines.
Automation performance requirements: Make
automation performance as high as possible without
sacrificing diagnostic transparency. In essence the
correct performance is that of the combined human and
automation, not one or the other in isolation [6]. The
more automation is making decisions or taking action,
the more accurate it needs to be in order for it to actually
provide improvement to the system as a whole [27],
while automating information acquisition and
assessment or analysis stages should be at least 70%
accurate [28].
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Don’t hide information, if possible: Do not hide
the raw data from users who need it, or at least, test
whether this is OK to do under both normal and
under failure conditions. Otherwise the system is
encouraging blind trust in automation and
complacency.
Ensure that users have clear explanations for
how data is gathered, assessed, decided, or acted
upon. Similar to the above, this form of diagnostic
transparency is common in systems used for purposes
of diagnosis by technical experts, but is often stripped
out or hidden in order to convey superficial
simplicity to other types of users. Ensure the purpose,
function, and scope of the automation is
communicated clearly and accurately to the user – let
them know whether it is operating in or outside of the
window of the designer’s intentions [59]. Make the
source of any potential automation failure clear: slow
degradation usually prevents people from recognizing
that the situation is changing and that the automation
may be malfunctioning [56].
Consider how users will interrupt or change
automation performance: Ensure operators can do
more than plan. Make sure automation, while being
effective under normal conditions, also allows its
users to revise and re-plan actions of importance.
The next set of recommendations are research
and experimentally focused, derived from our own
expertise, and the existent literature available to us at
this time, in addition to the gaps identified in this
paper. Research need 1: there is a need to generate
more, novel and specific evidence that the general
approach to automation and its principles applies to
cybersecurity. Partially that is our motivation in
writing this paper; we hope to have given enough
links and examples that future interested parties have
a better starting point to do so. This will help refine
and improve those recommendations. Research need
2: a more rigorous review of available cybersecurity
and automation literature should be conducted to
ascertain the state of the art. While we believe there
to be little evidence of widespread use, additional
practitioner perspective and anecdotal evidence could
be incorporated into best design and development
practices. There are available methodologies for
conducting literature reviews of this sort that could
be selected to fit these needs.

7. Conclusions
Automation for cybersecurity is possible; but the
philosophy of design of the automation should seek
to support human decision making. This is easier said
than done of course, as we acknowledge above many
times this is the hard part of the design decisions.

While some cyber tasks could be reconfigured from the
ground up, thus creating a new task for new people to
learn and become expert at, many cyber operations are
continuous 24/7/365 tasks that have enormous enterprise
inertia. They cannot be ‘halted’ and changed in major
ways without at least the perception if not the reality of
major risk to mission.
A first step is thinking of humans as your most
effective resource, and focusing on deeply understanding
what they know, how they work, and what they are good
at across time. The more that automation plays a central
role, the less of this flexibility will be available, resulting
in systems which are both brittle and inscrutable. The
obvious is that designing for and with users will mean
more use of the system by them, and hopefully more
efficient operations as a result. The best method of
development and delivery is an iterative and interactive
one. Early incorporation of a dedicated professional
human factors expert, clear enumeration of the goals of
the project and the tasks and goals of the user (as well as
the automation) can be leveraged toward developing a
useable system in the processes of Figure 2. Combined
with the phases of a kill chain, or the defensive goals du
jour, this would create powerful automated products and
technology that would ensure avoidance of the ‘ironies’
and improve the state of security. The iteration in design
and development incorporates the actual user base who
will go on to use the system; an expert human factors
professional is used to determine and weigh the user
feedback and interactions on prototype devices and
recommend changes to new iterations. Even the
measurements may change and evolve over time,
especially in the case of situational awareness, which is
very contextually based [57]
There are also existing, tested and proven methods
for understanding user roles, goals and mental methods
for performing work that are approachable for non–
human factors professionals to understand. As Pritchett
explains, the process is not over just by getting user
feedback, but requires using methods for testing humanautomation configurations: in other words, don’t just
hope to get it right, measure it and find out the pros and
cons.
Over-automated systems are difficult to navigate
and diagnose by humans, suggesting that simple and
powerful solutions for problems that are still on a
“human” time scale may be the best general design
concept available to us today. To develop more nuanced
guidelines will probably require, to some extent,
intelligently planned trial and error [22]. However,
combined with avoiding the ironies, improved design
methodology, and heavy incorporation of human factors
professionals, we believe great progress can be made in
cybersecurity.
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